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This is a two-part paper.  Part 1 addresses the diversity in the distribution of disposable income across the 
world; and Part 2, that in market income (i.e., before taxes and transferences).  There are many underlying 
questions to these phenomena: does the diversity of inequality in disposable incomes reflect a variety of 
fundamentals, or a multiplicity of power structures and choice?  Is rising market inequality the product of 
somehow ‘exogenous’ factors (e.g., r>g), or of complex interactions between political settlements and 
market failures?  If the latter, how do we get through the veils obscuring these interactions and distorting 
our vision of the often self-constructed nature of inequality?  Has neoliberal globalisation broadened the 
scope for “distributional failures” by, for example, triggering a process of “reverse catching-up” among 
OECD countries, so that now highly unequal middle-income countries like those in Latin America 
embody the shape of things to come?  If so, are we are all now converging towards features such as mobile 
élites creaming off the rewards of economic growth, and ‘magic realist’ politics that lack self-respect if 
not originality?  (Should I say, ‘Welcome to the Third World’?)  In Part 1 I also develop a new approach 
for examining and measuring inequality (distance from distributive targets).  In turn, Part 2 concentrates 
on three issues: why there has been such a deterioration of market inequality among countries of the 
OECD, why this has led to a growing asymmetry between their distributions of market and of disposable 
incomes, and why inequality seems to move in "waves".  The main conclusion is that to understand current 
distributive dynamics what matters is to comprehend the forces determining the share of the rich — and, 
in terms of growth, what they choose to do with it (and how they are allowed do it). 
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Inequality is a choice 
Joseph Stiglitz 
I am my choices 
Jean-Paul Sartre 
 
Introduction 
As suggested in Part 1 of this two-part paper, perhaps one of the most important 
analytical failings of current economic theory (despite recent significant progress) 
is our modest understanding of inequality, especially why there is such a huge 
diversity of inequality across the world, and why there has been such an 
enormous deterioration of market inequality among the OECD countries.2  Indeed, 
Krugman (2011) identified the latter as one of the two greatest analytical 
challenges today.3  This paper attempt to address some of these conundrums: 
Are contemporary patterns of market inequality the product of somehow 
‘exogenous’ factors (e.g., stocks of assets, such as human capital and knowledge, 
and their degree of adaptability to the new technological paradigm, the impact of 
a ‘fundamental force of divergence’, such as r>g)4, or a new cycle of Milanovic’s 
“Kuznets waves”;5 or are these patterns mainly the outcome of complex 
interactions between political settlements and market failures?  And if the latter, 
how do we get through the set of veils which typically obscure these interactions, 
and could easily distort our vision of the often self-constructed nature of 
inequality?  Finally, has the current neoliberal era broadened the scope for 
greater inequality by exacerbating ‘distributional failures’ around the world?   
In order to address these questions, in this two-part paper I shall look at 
nine distributional stylised facts of the current spectrum of inequality; and four 
relate to market inequality.  After identifying several layers of misunderstanding, 
I shall categorise seven types of ‘distributional failures’, and four of them relate to 
market inequality.  Basically, I suggest that globalization and financialisation6 
triggered a new process of ‘unequalisation’ across the OECD, which resembles a 
‘reverse catching-up’ with highly unequal middle-income countries (such as those 
in Latin America), in the sense that the latter countries now seem to show the 
                                   
2  For Part 1, see Palma (2019 c). 
3  Latin America’s perennial underperformance is the other (I give a tentative answer to 
this conundrum below).  For recent contributions, see Atkinson (2015); Bourguignon 
(2015); Galbraith (2016); Milanovic (2016); Ocampo (2019); Palma (2011 and 2016a); 
Piketty (2014); Scheidel (2017); Taylor (forthcoming 2020).   
4  r = return on capital; g = growth of income. 
5  Milanovic (2016).  
6  By ‘financialisation’ I understand the rise in size and dominance of the financial sector 
relative to the non-financial sector, as well as the diversification towards financial activities 
in non-financial corporations.   
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advanced ones the shape of things to come.  We are all indeed converging in 
market inequality, but we are converging towards features typical of highly 
unequal countries, such as mobile élites creaming off the rewards of economic 
growth, and ‘magic realist’ politics that lack self-respect if not originality.  I shall 
conclude that in order to understand distributive dynamics in either type of 
inequality, what really matters is to comprehend the share of the rich — and, in 
terms of economic growth, what they choose to do with that share, and how they 
are allowed do it.  
I shall conclude that inequality is a particularly complex (and surely over-
determined) phenomenon, which is often blurred by layers of distorting veils 
which sometimes make it resemble a hall of mirrors (which often conceal its 
frequent arbitrariness).  If this essay helps to make inequality more transparent 
by clarifying some of these layers of possible misunderstanding, it may hopefully 
help us take more responsibility as society for our distributional choices. 
 
 
1.-  The distribution of ‘market’ income across the world: 
‘market’ vs ‘social’ distributional outcomes  
 
No overall analysis of inequality, of course, can ignore market inequality (that is, 
inequality before taxes and transferences).  In this Part 2 of the paper, I analyse 
the four main stylised facts of market inequality, and in doing so I identify four 
distributional failures. 
 
i).- Stylised Fact 1: Significant deteriorations in market 
inequality since the 1980s have been confined to the OECD, 
Eastern Europe and Russia, and China and India 
 
The first stylised fact of market inequality is that significant deteriorations since 
the 1980s have occurred in just three groups of countries: the OECD; Eastern 
Europe and Russia; and China and India (Table 1). 
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TABLE 1 
Market and disposable income Ginis, c. 2016 vs. c. 1985 
Difference 
between 
2016 and 
1985
Difference 
between 
2016 and 
1985 2016 2016 2016 1985 1985 1985
Gini market 
Gini 
disposable 
income 
Gini market
Gini 
disposable 
income
Relative reduction 
of market 
inequality
Gini market
Gini 
disposable 
income
Relative reduction 
of market 
inequality
OECD* (16) 7 4 49 30 38% 42 26 37%
EE & Russia (13) 7 6 46 30 35% 39 24 38%
China & India 10 9 48 44 8% 38 35 8%
S Af.* (2) 4 3 68 60 12% 64 57 11%
LA (16) -3 -3 47 44 7% 50 47 6%
Rest of World (43) 0 0 45 39 14% 45 39 14%
World* (92) 2 1 47 38 19% 45 37 18%  
● OECD* includes 16 countries with increased inequality; S Af* = Botswana and South 
Africa.  
● Source: Solt (2018). Unfortunately, Solt only provides Ginis, giving no information on 
income shares by deciles; it is not possible, therefore, to use the methodologies developed 
above to analyse market inequality.  
 
As Table 1 indicates, in the 92 countries for which Solt (2018) provides 
information from c.1985, market inequality increased significantly in these three 
groups of countries.  It also continued to increase in Southern Africa.  Meanwhile, 
‘the rest of the world’, on average, has had no increase in either form of 
inequality, while Latin America had a relatively minor improvement on both of its 
huge Ginis.  I shall analyse these issues in the following sections. 
 
ii).- Stylised Fact 2: Most OECD countries attain a low level of 
disposable income inequality via a tortuous route 
 
When we look at market vs. social distributive outcomes, high-income countries 
now reach low levels of disposable income inequality via two very different routes 
— one of them being a rather tortuous one.  Figures 1 and 2 show the similarities 
and contrasts between Germany and Korea.  In terms of  resemblances, their 
disposable incomes have identical Palma ratios and Ginis (Figure 1).  
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FIGURE 1 
The Distribution of Disposable Income in Germany and Korea 
 
● Sources: WDI (2019). 
 
However, this remarkable similarity hides a major difference in how they got 
there, with Germany’s route being far more convoluted than Korea’s: in order to 
get to a disposable income Gini of about 30, Germany needs a relative reduction 
of its market Gini of 44 per cent, while Korea needs a decrease of just 9 per cent 
(Figure 2). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 6
 
FIGURE 2 
 
● LA = Latin America’s average market and disposable income Ginis; market = market 
Gini; disposable = disposable income Gini. a = German reunification; and b = Korea’s 
1997 financial crisis. 
● Source: Solt (2018).  Unless otherwise stated, this will be the source of all figures in this 
Part 2 of the paper.   
 
Germany’s market inequality started its relentless increase around the 1973 oil 
crisis, the stagflation that followed and the associated radical monetarist 
experiments.  However, as Germany was bent on maintaining its disposable 
income Gini just below 30, it had to increase its relative fiscal efforts to reduce its 
market Gini by about two-thirds.  Korea, meanwhile, only needed a fraction of 
that effort to achieve the same result; Solt (2018) shows that it comes close to 
doing so at source, with its market Gini at just 33.  Surely a first best route!7  
                                   
7  The WDI (2018) database indicates a similar disposable income Gini for Korea and 
Germany as Solt (2018).  However, the WID (2018), using tax return information, 
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Finland — which serves as a role model in so many respects — also joined 
the OECD’s unequalising rush and even caught up with Latin America’s average 
market inequality (Germany ended up even higher).  This is what I call ‘reverse 
catching up’, by which I mean it is now the highly unequal middle-income 
countries that seem to show the advanced countries the shape of things to come.  
As Figure 3 indicates, most of the OECD also followed the same route of opening 
up a huge gap between market and social distributive outcomes.  
FIGURE 3 
 
● LA = Latin America’s average market and disposable income Ginis; market = market 
Gini; disposable = disposable income Gini. a = German reunification; and b = Korea’s 
1997 financial crisis. 
 
                                                                                                    
indicates a rising share of the top 10 per cent.  Unfortunately, Solt (2018) does not 
provide information on shares by deciles.  The OECD (2019) shows similar data to Solt 
(ibid.) until 2015.  Subsequently it differs slightly due to the use of a new survey following 
a different methodology.  However, for the 28 OECD countries for which new data are 
provided after 2015, Korea still has the lowest market Gini in the whole OECD. 
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This asymmetry trap can be described in various ways — a ‘reverse catching up’ 
with highly unequal middle-income countries in market inequality while trying to 
hold on to past glories in their disposable income inequality (many just by the 
skin of their teeth); the idealisation of greed in one vs. that of social solidarity in 
the other; the tearing apart of the fabric of societies vs. the attempt to recreate 
‘reciprocal obligations’ (Collier, 2018).  Thatcher’s UK led this charge of the 
unequalising light brigade, winning the speed record.  But for the Iron Lady, 
‘there was no alternative’.  In fact, I don’t think she would have minded if 
someone had said ‘that was what it was really all about’.8   
What we are witnessing in the OECD is another type of distributional 
failure (number 4 on my overall list in both parts of the paper), which is not 
about increasing market inequality per se — large though this has been.  This 
failure is about the ever less sustainable gap between market and social 
distributional outcomes, and its inevitable plethora of distortions, transaction 
costs and public debts.  I want to highlight five (for a detailed analysis, see 
Appendix):  
i. Increased market-inequality has not been ‘Pareto-improving’ even in the 
‘Kaldor–Hicks’ sense. 
ii. There are also significant transaction costs in letting market inequality 
go one way only to try to reverse it later in terms of disposable income.  Like the 
Grand Old Duke of York: ‘He had ten thousand men; He marched them up to the 
top of the hill; And he marched them down again’. 
iii. But as the OECD’s ‘reverse catching up’ aimed not just at Latin-style 
market inequality, but also at its regressive taxation, the very rich and large 
corporations also became de facto practically tax-exempt.  So, instead of the 
winners compensating the losers it was those not invited to the party who were 
left with the bill, and had to be ‘over-taxed’ for this — but over-taxed not because 
of the growing needs of the poor, but in order to compensate the increasing tax 
evasion and avoidance of the winners. 
iv. As transfers balloon, governments’ debts are soaring.  The EU’s share 
of ‘social protection’ stands at 40 per cent of public expenditure — and with 
health and education, this share jumps to two-thirds.  But in their new tax status, 
corporations and the very rich now prefer to part-pay/part-lend their taxes, and 
part-pay/part-lend their wages (Palma, 2009).  It’s so much more fun than the 
old-fashioned way of having to pay for public goods via progressive taxation, and 
having to put up with positive but challenging wage–productivity dynamics.  That 
                                   
8  Although she might have added that she tried to legitimise greed, not hate—as the 
extreme right does now. 
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is, growing market inequality creates further necessities for public expenditure, 
while a new generous tax status for those who benefited most denies the 
necessary public revenues.  And as there are limits to taxing those ‘others-than-
the-real-winners’ (ask the gilet jaunes), governments’ debts are mounting. 
v. Finally, now that OECD markets have finally been unshackled from all 
those Keynesian ‘rigidities’ and ‘distortions’ brought about by well intentioned but 
supposedly economically misguided post-war policies, are Latin America’s levels 
of market inequality really the new rising sun? Are OECD countries now embarked 
on a ‘creative destruction’ of those rigidities, or just bent on some (fairly 
uncreative and highly corrosive) ‘reverse catching up’, including the return of 
some of their own disagreeable ghosts of the past? 
As discussed in detail for Europe in Appendix 5 (and in section 2.4 below 
for the US), it seems highly unlikely that élites and special interest groups 
captured policies with the aim of enhancing economic efficiency.9  Here the 
comparison between Germany and Korea in Figures 1 and 2 is particularly 
relevant.  In the 45-year period since the beginning of the deterioration of 
Germany’s market inequality, its productivity has not even doubled: neither has 
the productivity of Western Europe or the US.  Korea, meanwhile, has increased 
its productivity six fold (or eightfold in terms of output per hour worked).  
Previously, Germany had trebled its productivity level in half that time — or 
nearly quadrupled its output per hour worked (TED, 2018).  Now, by contrast, in 
the latest quarter of 2018 Germany barely escaped recession (Ewing, 2019).  Not 
a lot to show for the 15 percentage points increase in its market Gini. 
Of course, many other things were happening at the same time, not least 
the onset of a new technological revolution, with its likely initial negative impact 
upon inequality (Pérez, 2016).  But it would be hard to argue that productivity 
growth in Germany (and the OECD, apart from the special case of Ireland) would 
have been even more dismal had market inequality not been allowed to 
deteriorate in this bizarre way.10  In Germany, for example, the relentless 
deterioration of market inequality and its underinvestment (both private and 
public) took place side by side with a reversal of its relationship with emerging 
Asia.  According to one Financial Times columnist: 
Germany once saw China as an export market for machinery with which China 
would develop its industrial base.  Today, China is becoming the senior partner in 
the relationship.  [Germany’s] biggest problem is falling behind in the technological 
race… . [This] is symptomatic of a fundamental European problem… .[Now there] 
are signs that complacency is about to turn into panic.  (Münchau, 2018) 
                                   
9  On the power of vested interests in today’s rent-extracting economy, see for example 
Wolf (2018). 
10  On Ireland, see O’Connor and Staunton (2018).  
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In sum, this fourth distributional failure is not about increasing market inequality 
per se.  It is about the ever growing (and less sustainable) disparity between 
market and social distributional outcomes.  Inevitably, this ‘asymmetry trap’ 
creates problems not just for growth, but also leads to having to make too much 
fiscal effort unnecessarily (as in self-constructed welfare needs).  It is even worse 
if this effort is done off-target in revenues (as in the winners getting away scot-
free, and others with less political clout being forced to pick up the social 
protection bill); if it leads to mounting public sector debts; and if the fiscal effort 
is put on the wrong track in expenditure (as in making the very rich the biggest 
welfare recipients of all time).  From this perspective, and as discussed in detail in 
the Appendix, today’s post-modern Robin Hood welfare-state ‘robs’ the rich to 
give to the very rich. 
Life is not that easy anymore in the OECD, having a family and an 
oligarchy to support.  Should I say ‘Welcome to the Third World’?  
 
Stylised Fact 2.3: Emerging markets with extreme inequality 
in both areas are normally those whose higher tolerance for 
all types of inequality leads them to make little fiscal effort 
to correct their high market inequality 
 
Oddly enough, there is one remarkable similarity between unequal Latin American 
countries and some low market inequality Asian ones: they make little effort to 
reduce their market inequality via taxes and transferences, as illustrated in 
Figures 4 and 5.   
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FIGURE 4 
 
 
Unlike the first-best route chosen by Taiwan or Korea, but like the OECD, Latin 
American countries let ‘market makers’ do more or less as they please, but as 
opposed to the OECD they are not prepared to make much effort to close the 
distributive gap. 
Here, governments prefer to do more talking than acting in terms of social 
protection and inequality (Figure 4).  Unfortunately, wishful-thinking (let alone 
progressive ‘hot air’) hasn’t proved to be of much help for inequality. 
Figure 5 gives relevant information for four of the five BRICS.   
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FIGURE 5 
 
● a = election of President Lula da Silva; and b = election of President Mandela. 
 
In India, the speed of deterioration of both forms of inequality is remarkable, as 
is the lack of effort it makes to correct this, despite its rapid growth.  As a result, 
there are still more people below the poverty line in India than in the whole of 
sub-Saharan Africa.  There are other dark sides to India’s rapid transformation, 
such as having become the most polluted country in the world (Bernard and 
Kazmin, 2018).  And horrific episodes such as the wave of suicides by desperate 
small farmers (who had been thrown to the wolves), the largest recorded such 
wave in history, also show the more Dantesque side of India’s increasing market 
inequality and insecurity. 
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China’s deterioration of market inequality has been one of the fastest, but 
it seems that it has finally begun to stabilise.11  It is unlikely that when Deng 
Xiaoping said: ‘Let some people get rich first’, he imagined that the richest 1 per 
cent of households would end up owning at least a third of China’s wealth (the 
actual figure is bound to be much higher, as there is significant underreporting; 
Pilling, 2014; Wildau and Mitchell, 2016).  But in contrast to Latin America, the 
rich at least devote a great deal of their share of income to investment. 
In South Africa, meanwhile, both types of inequality have worsened since 
the beginning of democracy.  Furthermore, even though — like Brazil — its 
market Gini reduction has reached at least double digits, this is a modest effort 
since in both countries fiscal revenues are relatively similar to the OECD (Di John, 
2006; Lieberman, 2003; OECD, 2019).  The difference between these two 
countries is that South Africa, despite a relatively progressive taxation, fails to 
achieve more due to an ineffective system of transfers to the poor.  Brazil, by 
contrast, although it has (or should I now say ‘it had’?) a more effective 
programme of transfers, falls down badly on its highly regressive tax structure.  
Furthermore, in Brazil transfers to the poor are often a smokescreen to justify 
transfers to the administrative classes — which are bent on catching up with their 
Mediterranean counterparts.12  
This also helps put into perspective Latin America’s recent improvements 
in inequality.  Not only do household surveys fail particularly badly to capture the 
income of the very rich (Meyer et al., 2015), but governments are reluctant to 
make tax returns available for double-checking these apparent improvements in 
inequality.  (I wonder why.) Indeed, studies based on aggregate fiscal data for 
Brazil and Chile show that there is no decline of income shares at the top, or in 
their Ginis.13  The latest study on Brazil (Morgan, 2017) indicates a relatively 
stable Gini, contradicting its decline in survey data.  For Chile, also using 
aggregate data since access to original data was also denied, one study (Atria et 
al., 2018) finds that the share of the top 1 per cent has actually increased since 
                                   
11  UTIP (2018) and WID(2018) confirm this; the OECD(2019) reports a smaller Gini 
reduction (6 per cent).  However, studies by Peking University and Southwest University in 
Chengdu present a more pessimistic picture (Wildau and Mitchell, 2016). 
12  While the ‘Bolsa Familia’ for the poor costs just half a percentage point of GDP (Holmes 
et al., 2011), bureaucrats, for example, retire on average at 56 (men) and 53 (women), 
and with at least 70 per cent of their final salary — many get up to 100 per cent (OECD, 
2017).  So, anything up to one-third of public expenditure has been devoted to pensions, 
while public investment does not reach even 2 per cent of GDP, in a country with a literally 
crumbling infrastructure (IMF, 2018b).  
13  For Brazil, see Gobetti and Orair (2016); Medeiros et al. (2014); Morgan (2017); for 
Chile, see Atria et al. (2018); López et al. (2013). 
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2003, and that of the top 10 per cent keeps hovering around 55 per cent.14  And 
another study (López et al., 2013), which tries to take into account tax evasion, 
concludes that in Chile the top 1 per cent appropriates almost a third of national 
income (the equivalent figure for Korea is 12 per cent and for Taiwan 11 per 
cent); the top 0.1 per cent appropriates one-fifth (in Korea this is 4 per cent); 
and the top 0.01 per cent — about 300 families — gets well over one-tenth of the 
pie (in Korea that group, which includes some of the most successful 
entrepreneurs in the world, seems satisfied with a seventh of that: 1.7 per 
cent).15  
In part, this huge inequality is due to the Latin American élite believing it 
has some divine right to the rents of natural resources, a modern version of the 
Droit du seigneur, as it were; to access fiscal paradises; as well as to free-ride on 
public goods paid by others.  These élites are even reluctant to help eradicate 
poverty, although this would be remarkably cheap in high middle-income 
countries (Ravallion, 2010).16  
In sum, while Solt’s database suggests that Brazil and Chile manage at 
least a market Gini reduction in double digits (though the OECD [2019] only 
reports 7.1 per cent for Chile), tax returns indicate a different picture for D10 and 
for the Gini.  It is therefore highly unlikely that the overall distribution could have 
improved much, if at all.  Furthermore, as discussed in Palma (2011, 2016a), 
Chilean evidence also indicates a distributional ‘ratchet effect’: when inequality 
improves, this has a temporary effect, and when it deteriorates it leaves a more 
permanent legacy, as those at the top are better able to sustain their gains.  
Recent events in Brazil indicate that this asymmetric cycle is about to take a 
reinvigorated new upswing. 
As Walter Benjamin (1966) remarked, behind every rise of fascism lies the 
failure of a major political project: in Latin America (but not only there), it is the 
failure of the so-called ‘Third Way’.  In fact, its very dullness — with its 
                                   
14  Furthermore, since only 81,000 taxpayers acknowledged in 2018 having an income that 
would pay the top marginal rate (just 35 per cent), massive levels of tax avoidance and 
evasion mean that tax returns information underestimates significantly the degree of 
inequality (Guzmán, 2019). 
15  For Chile’s stubborn inequality, see Palma (2011: Appendix 1). 
16  ECLAC (2010) calculates that in six countries of Latin America, the cost of a ‘one 
poverty line’ monetary transfer to all the unemployed, all people over 64, and all children 
under 15 of vulnerable households would be equivalent to between 1.8 and 2.7 per cent of 
GDP — not such an insurmountable task! For why so little is actually done, perhaps 
Dante’s Inferno gives a hint — especially in the Fourth Circle (greed), and in the Eighth 
(fraud).  In fact, the Inferno has been defined as ‘the realm… of those who have… 
perverted their human intellect to fraud or malice against their fellow men’ (MacAllister, 
1953: 14).  For poverty reduction in Latin America, see UNDP (2016); for Chile, Durán and 
Kremerman (2015); for Brazil, Holmes et al. (2011); and for South Africa, Tregenna 
(2012). 
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preference for improving the administrative efficiency of the intrinsically 
inefficient unequal markets — seems to have caused such a failure of the 
collective social imagination that otherwise unthinkable options have become 
possible.17   
This fifth distributional failure is about letting oligarchies run amok, while 
(as mentioned above) governments do more talking than acting in terms of social 
protection and inequality.18   While the rich were let off the hook, the middle were 
over-taxed, got mediocre public services in return, and ended up highly indebted 
— at some of the highest real interest rates (Wheatley, 2012) and mark-ups 
(Pearson, 2012) in the world. In turn, although the poor got a little bit of social 
protection and some crucial rights, they also received a massive dose not only of 
market insecurity, but also of personal insecurity, with crime spiralling out of 
control.19 
 
Stylised Fact 2.4: Increased market inequality in the OECD 
has really been about extracting value created by others 
 
It never ceases to amaze me how little of the deluge of extra income 
appropriated by those at the top in the OECD — as well as how little of the 
soaring corporate profits — has been diverted to productive uses, such as 
investment.  The US is again transparent in this distributional failure — my 
number 6 (Figure 6). 
                                   
17  As in many parts of the world, the Left in Latin America divided into two streams after 
1980, but both have a crucial element in common: they are still stuck in the past.  While 
the ‘old left’ (e.g., Chavismo in Venezuela) tried to reconstruct an idealised past by 
demonising everything that has happened since, the ‘new left’ (e.g., Brazil and Chile, as in 
Britain) attempted instead to construct a future which was almost the exact opposite of the 
past — and in order to idealise this future, they have demonised every possible aspect of 
that past.  In sum, as neither Left has been able to leave the past behind, when 
constructing the future (as in Hotel California) ‘some dance to remember, some dance to 
forget’, but ‘we are all just prisoners here, of our own device’. 
18  A good example of letting oligarchies run amok is Chile’s private pension 
system, which has been copied in many other Latin American countries.  While in 
its inception, it promised 70 per cent income replacement, it has only delivered 
an average monthly pension that does not even reach the minimum wage 
(Mander, 2016), and it is on its way to a median pension of just 15 per cent of 
the final salary (Bonnefoy, 2016).  In fact, last year 125 thousand people retired 
within this system, and half of them with less than one-fifth of a minimum wage 
(Palma, 2019b).  So, governments are again having to give massive subsidies to 
keep this system going, even though stopping subsidies was supposed to be the 
very reason why pensions were privatised in the first place.  In the meantime, 
exorbitant fees, hidden charges and other tricks generate massive profits for 
pension providers (CENDA, 2019), who only bother to pay pensions that amount 
to much less than half of what they collect as contributions (Bonnefoy, 2016; 
CENDA, 2019).  
19  Unequal Latin America has 41 of the 50 most dangerous cities in the world — and all of 
the top 12 (www.worldatlas.com/articles/most-dangerous-cities-in-the-world.html). 
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FIGURE 6 
 
● fin assets = stock of financial assets; priv inv = fixed private investment; a = the 2008 
financial crisis. 
3-year moving averages.  Malaysia’s current percentage is 77 per cent; Taiwan’s 74 per 
cent; and Korea’s 62 per cent. 
● Sources: Income shares (from tax-returns): WID (2018); Financial assets: FED (2018); 
Private investment: for the US, BEA (2019; includes equipment and non-residential 
structures); for the rest, IMF (2018b); WDI (2018).   
 
There are at least three fundamental issues that emerge from the four panels of 
Figure 6.  The first relates to the relationship between income distribution and 
private investment.  If the US had the same level of national income, but with the 
same level of inequality as when Reagan was elected, the top 1 per cent would 
today be earning about US$ 2 trillion less than it actually does.  In turn, if the US 
had the same income and inequality as now, but its share of investment to GDP 
were as it was pre-Reagan, over US$ 1 trillion more would be invested per year.  
Linking the two together — i.e., private investment as a percentage of the income 
share of the top 10 per cent — we find a clear ‘reverse catching up’ in motion 
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with countries at the other side of the Rio Grande (and even South Africa; see 
Figure 6, top left-hand panel).  In turn, net private investment all but 
disappeared (BEA, 2019), and non-residential private investment as a share of 
the income of the top 1 per cent fell as if in a roller coaster (top right-hand panel). 
It is often acknowledged that the only historical legitimacy of capitalism — 
that is, the legitimacy of a small élite to appropriate such a large proportion of 
the social product — rests on that élite’s capacity to use it productively, and to 
develop the productive forces along the way.  It can only do this by reinvesting 
most of that huge share.  Keynes (1919: 10), for example, explains the contrast 
between ‘emerging’ Germany and the US vs. Britain during the (investment-
intensive) ‘Third Technological Revolution’, or third great surge of industrialisation, 
that of the ‘Age of Steel, Electricity and Heavy Engineering’:  
‘The new rich of the nineteenth century… preferred the power which investment 
gave them to the pleasures of immediate consumption… .  Herein lay, in fact, the 
main justification of the capitalist system.  If the rich had spent their new wealth 
on their own enjoyments, the world would long ago have found such a régime 
intolerable’. 
 
There is not much danger of finding these enlightened Schumpeterian 
characteristics in the current newly rich of the US or Europe (West or East).  In 
contrast to what Keynes says of their counterparts of another epoch, in most of 
today’s newly rich the ‘discreet charm’ of the Latin American bourgeoisie rules.  
The reality principle has been slowly but surely hijacked by the pleasure principle 
— one that is easily satisfied by an endless supply of low-hanging fruit such as 
effortless asset bubbles, timid state institutions, an obliging macro and public 
finance, a considerate progressive intelligentsia, highly profitable market failures, 
and rents from artificially created oligopolistic concentration, all coming from a 
growing aversion to competition or any other form of market compulsion.  It is 
not by chance that many lucky rentiers all over the OECD now live a life of milk-
and-honey by getting funds from captured Central Banks for free (or at near-zero 
interest rates), just to relend those funds at high interest rates to the same 
taxpayers who are subsidising them in the first place.  Even Latin-style 
oligarchies usually have to try a bit harder than that. 
In fact, witnessing what is happening today in the OECD helps us to 
understand why the Latin American élites are what they are: perhaps they have 
just been able to do, for a much longer period of time, what the OECD’s élites can 
do now!  It’s all about being able to build a capitalist system without 
‘compulsions’ (see analysis after Figure 8 below).  The specificities may be 
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different, but the core problem is the same.20  In fact, in this reverse catching up, 
some of the disagreeable ghosts of the past have also re-emerged; for example, 
most large corporations are now likely to include forced labour in their supply 
chains (Foroudi, 2018).  Perhaps not surprisingly, with the exception of a few 
high-tech activities, manufacturing is increasingly becoming an optional extra 
across the OECD as well.21 
Who needs the sticks of market compulsions and productivity challenges 
— such as healthy competition and policy driving private investment towards 
sectors with higher potentials for productivity growth (Wood, 2002) — when 
political élites are now so good at solving the collective action problem of how to 
share the carrots, and at making the ‘entry’ of others as hard and risky as 
possible.  Douglas North was surely right when he developed his ‘limited access 
order’ hypothesis, emphasising how political élites like to divide up the control of 
rents and block the access of others (North et al., 2007).  And this ‘limited access 
order’ has worked rather well: if wealth inequality in the US was the same as 
when Reagan was elected, the top 1 per cent would today own half its current 
wealth — and the top 0.1 per cent one-third, and the top 0.01 per cent one-fifth 
(Saez and Zucman, 2016).  
The second main issue that emerges from Figure 6 is the relationship 
between financialisation and income distribution.  The bottom left-hand panel 
shows a remarkable co-integration between the surge in the value of the stock of 
financial assets and the increased share of income of the top 10 per cent (Palma, 
2009).  However, this so-called ‘financial deepening’, instead of pulling private 
investment with it (the revitalising effects promised by McKinnon and Shaw, one 
of the founding ideas of the Washington Consensus), had the opposite effect 
(bottom right-hand panel).  However, this ‘financial deepening’ did at least made 
a contribution if viewed from Walter Benjamin’s (1966) perspective: as fascism 
expanded the logic of spectacle into the field of politics, financialisation, with its 
pyrotechnics, did the same in the field of economics, as illustrated, for example, 
by the S&P 500 soaring more than 320 per cent between 2009 and mid-2018, the 
longest bull market on record, creating more than US$ 18 trillion of (virtual) 
wealth on the way.  This must have been a spectacle indeed for the rest of the 
population, whose median household wealth was actually falling (Collins et al., 
                                   
20  And this helps answer Krugman’s question regarding Latin America’s perennial 
underperformance (see footnote 3 above).  
21  On ‘premature de-industrialisation’, see Palma (2005, 2008); Tregenna (2014); see 
also Rodrik’s much later contribution (2015).  For a revealing analysis of how the US 
economy has been running the dualistic processes Polanyi and Lewis described, but in 
reverse, see Taylor (2020). 
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2018).  Furthermore, the rampant financial mania at the top took place side by 
side with the real economy gasping for air: paradise for the former became a 
purgatory for the latter (see Figure 8 below). 
It has become pretty obvious by now that financialisation and increased 
market inequality in the OECD was about making it easier to get rich by 
extracting value from those who actually create it, or from cashing-in on assets 
already created (see especially Mazzucato, 2018).  One aspect of this 
phenomenon is what the chief economist of the Bank of England calls corporate 
‘self-cannibalism’: how private investment becomes a collateral damage of the 
unholy alliance between a new breed of ‘bullying’ shareholders and self-seeking 
executives that has led to companies being dismantled, or condemned to debt, in 
order to increase immediate income.22  
Easy access to cheap debt has also fuelled a US$ 40 trillion mergers and 
acquisitions mania during the last decade23 —the greatest anti-competition drive 
ever seen—with its fragile leveraged loan structures and bizarre fees and 
commissions.  Some of the bogeymen of the past financial crisis are back in 
fashion too, like ‘synthetic’ CDOs and credit default swaps (US$ 8 trillion of them 
— remember AIG?), although it is patently clear that they are not fit for purpose.  
Indeed, they have been defined by a Financial Times columnist as ‘a gigantic, 
incomprehensible global joke’.  He goes on to ask: ‘Can anyone find a way to 
bury this absurd pseudo-market?’ (Dizard, 2018b).24  
As a finance professor (and buyback proponent) insists, ‘Serving 
customers, creating innovative new products, employing workers, taking care of 
the environment… are NOT the objectives of firms’; everything is about 
‘maximising shareholders’ value’ (quoted in Brettell et al., 2015a).  Yes, but what 
is the role of competition and policy if not to force a link between both sets of 
objectives, so that the only way that corporations could maximise shareholders’ 
value would be by focusing on the other set of issues? Unsurprisingly, those 
                                   
22  If shareholders used to get 10 per cent of corporate profits, they now want it all (and 
more).  Where they once kept shares for six years, now it is for less than six months, 
implying far less concern for the long-term health of the firm.  For Keynes, in contrast, the 
relationship between a shareholder and the firm should be ‘like marriage’ (1936/2018: 
140).  
23  See the statistics of the Institute of Mergers, Acquisitions and Alliances: 
https://imaainstitute.org/mergers-and-acquisitions-statistics/ 
24  Credit default swap (CDS) trading firms have even been found to be involved in 
‘manufactured defaults’; that is, encouraging companies to deliberately default on their 
debt in order to trigger CDS payouts (in return for favourable financing).  This fraud is 
technically known by its magical realist name: ‘narrowly tailored credit events’ (Rennison, 
2019a).  On the return to ‘synthetic’ CDOs and other products blamed for the last financial 
crisis, an insider complains, ‘it’s almost beyond belief that the very same people that 
claimed to be expert risk managers, who almost blew up the world in 2008, are back with 
the very same products’ (quoted in Rennison, 2019b). 
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seeking to maximise shareholders’ value, irrespective of the way in which it is 
done, are happy to break those links by letting, for example, a mergers and 
acquisitions frenzy dilute competition, by allowing buybacks to distort share 
prices, and by transforming states into emasculated institutions and their policies 
into a rentier made-to-measure affair.  In fact, it now seems that élites would not 
settle for anything less than governments resembling Stepford wives.  What is 
really needed to rein in market inequality is to re-engineer the links between both 
sets of objectives.  For example, for most of the 20th century, stock buybacks 
were deemed illegal because they are just a crude form of stock manipulation.  
But in 1982 they were legalised by the US Securities and Exchange Commission, 
becoming one of the most popular tools for inflating share prices, and boosting 
earnings per share and executive pay. 
If one adds changes to corporate governance law (e.g., in 1992 Congress 
changed the tax code to encourage performance-based compensation), and to 
shareholders’ taxation, stock buybacks become a tax-efficient cash machine 
allowing shareholders and top executives to extract capital from corporations — 
what Reuters now calls the ‘cannibalised-company business model’ (Brettell et al., 
2015b). 
In fact, this ‘buyback derangement syndrome’ has become one of the main 
fuels powering the stock market, with S&P 500 corporations spending nearly US$ 
5 trillion on them since the first quarter of 2009 (borrowing massively to finance 
those purchases).25 As one insider explains, ‘Basically what you’re seeing in the 
stock market is a slow-motion leveraged buyout of the entire market’ (quoted in 
Brettell and Aeppel, 2015).  On top of that, an amount equivalent to about two-
thirds of this figure has been distributed in dividends (Brettell and Aeppel, 2015; 
Wigglesworth, 2019).  In fact, in 2018 buybacks alone became larger than overall 
capital expenditure among the S&P 500 corporations (Powell, 2019).26  
Trump’s tax cuts just fuelled this binge; J.P. Morgan has estimated that 
about half of all the overseas profits of US corporations repatriated since the tax 
cuts have been spent on buybacks (Tankersley and Phillips, 2018).  In the 
meantime, ‘at least 90 percent of Americans will end up poorer thanks to 
[Trump’s tax] cut’ (Krugman, 2019).  Apple, for example, immediately announced 
buybacks and dividends of another US$ 100 billion on top of the US$ 210 billion it 
                                   
25  Before the latest round of tax cuts, buybacks were pretty much mirrored by higher 
corporate debt (Yardeni Research Inc., 2019; see also Lazonick, 2014, and Lazonick et al., 
2013).  
26  Last year, US companies handed their shareholders US$ 1.3 trillion through dividends 
and buybacks, lifting the post-crisis bonanza to US$ 8 trillion (Wigglesworth, 2019).  In 
turn, net non-residential private investment in structures and equipment reached only 
one-third of this figure. 
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had already committed since 2012 (see Ram, 2018) — a sum greater than the 
market value of all but 20 of the US’s biggest listed companies (e.g., bigger than 
Verizon, AT&T, Boeing, Oracle, MasterCard, Coca-Cola, Procter & Gamble, Citi or 
Disney).  The idea of using these huge resources instead to diversify Apple 
properly into artificial intelligence, robotics, autonomous car electronics, and all 
those industries of the future seems beyond the pale (that is, beyond the 
boundary from where emerging Asia begins).  Within the pale, instead, it is more 
fitting to pay exorbitant remuneration to executives, to ‘return’ a tsunami of 
funds to intimidating shareholders, to torment customers by (for example) 
slowing down their older iPhones to force them to keep upgrading to new (and 
often fairly similar) products, and by the decline of the reliability of products.  
Perhaps it is about time to start shorting corporations such as Apple. 
To state the obvious, sustainable growth comes from enriching the 
productivity ecosystem as a whole, not the net worth of shareholders and top 
executives of a handful of firms.  Furthermore, the combination of weak corporate 
investment and rising corporate net saving also drives the growing mismatch in 
financial markets between abundant liquidity and a shortage of solid financial 
assets, so that the ease of performing a transaction in a hollow security or 
instrument has become the trademark of the current process of financialisation 
(Palma, 2009). 
No wonder Kindleberger (2005) borrowed from psychoanalysis the concept 
of ‘mania’ — an over-excited, grandiose detachment from reality — to refer to 
what others just call ‘bubbles’ or ‘exuberance’.  But the antiregulatory brigade 
even uses lessons from ‘the prisoner’s dilemma’ in interactive game theory in 
their defence: selfish individuals, entirely for their own selfish reasons, have 
incentives to behave in a pleasant, tolerant and unenvious way.  Therefore, if 
those predestined to win at the market are the nice guys, why regulate markets 
(including finance), or worry about inequality? 
The third and final issue emerging from Figure 6 is what’s to be done next.  
In fact, the type of policies tried so far have not just distorted market inequality 
and crowded out productive spending; they seem to have crowded out 
neoclassical economics as well, as many of its usually more imaginative followers 
can now only think about more of the same.  These policies—such as Obama’s 
fiscal stimulus, and the FED’s bubble-inducing quantitative easing (QE), or what a 
Financial Times columnist now calls the ‘cash for trash’ scheme (McWilliams, 
2019) — may have delivered the longest bull market on record, but only a tiny 
proportion of its associated resources were used to create new productive 
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capacities.27  And real wages were ‘lower in 2014 than in 2005 for about two-
thirds of households in 25 advanced economies—more than 500 million people’ 
(Tyson and Madgavkar, 2016). 
Nevertheless, many insist that the only way forward is for more 
unproductive spending — even if to stimulate that requires an endless succession 
of bubbles; for example, Summers (2013) argues that ‘Most of what [could] be 
done under the aegis of preventing a future [financial] crisis would be 
counterproductive’.  Krugman (2013) agrees: ‘[now] even improved financial 
regulation is not necessarily a good thing… it may discourage irresponsible 
lending and borrowing at a time when more spending of any kind is good for the 
economy’.  So, as a Faustian bargain, their advice is to keep refilling the punch 
bowl until ‘markets’ are satisfied — as if they ever will be (not much evidence of 
diminishing returns here). 
However, as we already know, credit booms weaken (rather than 
strengthen) output in the medium run (Borio et al., 2018; Lombardi et al., 2017; 
Mian et al., 2017), and increased market inequality has a negative impact on 
growth (see Ostry et al., 2014).  Also, as the richest 10 per cent already own 
about 80 per cent of overall wealth, including six of every seven stocks held by 
individuals (and the richest 1 per cent own half), more stock market bubbles are 
unlikely to boost expenditure much (even the unproductive kind) as they will just 
shift even more wealth to those ‘cash-hoarding’ agents who are already 
responsible for the ‘savings glut’ (Krueger, 2012; Phillips, 2018).28  Furthermore, 
global debt — and its components — is already bursting at the seams (it has 
swelled 50 per cent in the decade since the credit crisis), and financial fragility is 
evident everywhere.29  Junk bonds are already knocking on the US$ 4 trillion 
mark just in the US, and half of all investment-grade corporate bonds are already 
at BBB, or just one step from junk status (Rickards, 2019).  Therefore, if this 
goes wrong, it could be ugly: ‘If default rates were to reach only 10% — a 
conservative assumption — this corporate debt fiasco will be at least six times 
larger than the subprime losses in 2007–08’ (ibid.). 
                                   
27  Less than 1 per cent of the nearly US$ 1 trillion of Obama’s fiscal ‘stimulus’ went to 
highway and environmental projects—in a country that desperately needs both (Palma, 
2009).  
28  As Krueger (2012: 7) reminds us, ‘the top 1 percent of households saves about half of 
the increases in their wealth, while the population at large had a general savings rate of 
about 10%.  This implies that if another $1.1 trillion had been earned by the bottom 99% 
instead of the top 1%, annual consumption would be about US$440 billion higher.  This 
would be a 5% boost to aggregate consumption’.  
29  For example, in the US ‘half the core business of financing or refinancing houses is 
under water’ (Dizard, 2019). 
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Furthermore, what secular stagnationists (surprisingly) miss is that given 
relatively low levels of OECD unemployment, current sluggish growth must be at 
least as much about the composition of effective demand as its level, that is, 
increasing inequality driving actual corporate and household spending away from 
its productive component (see Figure 8 below).30  
In the meantime, emerging Asia can’t believe its luck; all of the above has 
opened up huge productive opportunities, and many Asian corporations certainly 
know how to take advantage.  Samsung, for example, has just announced a US$ 
160 billion three-year investment in new technologies (including those industries 
of the future which Apple seems to so reluctant to tackle properly, from artificial 
intelligence to biopharmaceuticals).  According to one Financial Times analyst, 
‘This can be regarded as the world’s biggest [corporate] investment.  Samsung is 
injecting the equivalent of their operating profits back into the business’ (Harris, 
2018b).  ‘[This] investment plan eclipses a pledge made by Apple to divert 
US$30bn to expand its US operations’ (Harris, 2018a). 
As logic and unfettered greed have never been the best bedfellows, 
perhaps the contrast highlighted above between Korea’s market inequality and 
productivity growth, and those of the OECD will not be too difficult to understand 
— or indeed the question of why the West is losing its leadership in many of the 
industries of the future.  For example, the US does not even have a telecoms 
equipment maker left to compete with Huawei.  Europe at least still has Ericsson 
and Nokia (although they are already struggling).  In the meantime, its financial 
sector keeps growing out of control: as a mortgage industry investment banker 
stated, ‘I would say the industry has an overcapacity of about one-third in its 
current structure (quoted in Dizard, 2019). 
Surely increased market inequality and lethargic growth can be 
reengineered.  Saint Augustine argued that our free will has been weakened but 
not destroyed by original sin.  Buybacks, for example, can be redefined again for 
what they are — crude market manipulation — and policy could well help redirect 
(‘discipline’) these funds towards investment.  Tax cuts for the rich can also be 
reversed.31  In fact, since 2001, federal tax changes have reduced revenue by 
more than US$ 5 trillion.32  US bankruptcy law could also overturn its 1978 
                                   
30  ‘Secular stagnation’ refers to a situation in which there is a slow rate of growth of GDP 
due to chronically weak demand (relative to potential output).  This is blamed on the 
(unobservable) ‘natural’ rate of interest for having become negative. 
31  One billionaire has saved over a million dollars a day on taxes on his dividends since 
Bush’s 2003 tax cut (Wamhoff and Gardner, 2018). 
32  And this figure does not include hundreds of billions of dollars in so-called tax cut 
‘extenders’ for corporations and other businesses that Congress has periodically enacted 
under each administration (ibid.) 
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change to stop private equity firms using Chapter 11 as a pension-laundering 
scheme (Whoriskey, 2018); and there is no reason to stick with the 2003 law that 
prohibited governments from negotiating drug prices for Medicare (which has 
gifted more than US$ 50 billion a year to the pharmaceutical industry).  By not 
considering such changes in legislation — which only big money could have had 
the clout to ram through — we will not only have to keep paying a high price for 
current inefficiencies but, as Stiglitz (2018) argues and as events in Eastern 
Europe, Russia, the Philippines, India, the US, Brazil and several other countries 
indicate, we are now even risking our democracy.  Even the 2018 World Economic 
Forum in Davos was opened with a speech warning that ‘the ongoing 
disintegration of our social fabric could ultimately lead to the collapse of 
democracy’ (Schwab, 2018). 
It must have felt equally naïve 130 years ago to believe that it was 
possible to change antitrust laws to prevent the agglomeration of market power, 
and Standard Oil and American Tobacco must have seemed as untouchable as 
today’s FAANGs.33  However, unless one swallows the ‘end of history’ discourse, 
one has to accept that evolution has always been a challenge to dominant agents.  
After all, as Chekhov said, the world is no more than our conception of it.  In sum, 
and in contrast to what the secular stagnationists propose — and the high-end of 
the art market, private-jet, super-yacht and sports-car industries dream of — the 
last thing we now need for reactivating the world economy is more of what even 
the Financial Times now calls ‘silly-billy’ (silly-billionaires) (Lee, 2018).  Today, 
many are even deluded into believing they have finally created a ‘perpetual 
motion’ machine — one which doesn’t require an injection of proper energy (net 
investment) to keep producing all-time record profits (Figure 7). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                   
33  FAANG is an acronym for the five best-performing tech stocks: Facebook, Apple, 
Amazon, Netflix and Google. 
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FIGURE 7 
 
● earnings = real earnings; productivity = output per worker.  3-year moving averages. 
● Sources: Productivity and earnings: EPI (2017); Output: WDI (2018); Employment: TED 
(2018). 
 
In the US, average wages have been practically stagnant in real terms since the 
early 1970s, and productivity growth per worker has slowed to just 1.4 per cent 
p.a. — phenomena which are surely interconnected, as the former is highly likely 
to become a significant disincentive for the latter.  As male earnings have been 
stagnant, the difference between the value of what an average worker produces 
and what a male worker is paid rose in realterms from US$ 20,000 in 1980, to 
US$ 70,000 in 2015.  That is, the ‘gross surplus’ per male worker increased 3.5-
fold.  For female workers, it doubled from US$ 40,000 to US$ 80,000.   
This changing income distribution within US firms, and the resulting fall in 
wage shares and weak effective demand and investment rates, has been 
associated with increasingly hierarchical structures and the systematic 
redistribution of income to the top of the corporate hierarchy (Fix, 2018).  This is 
reflected in a swelling CEO pay ratio: Disney, while cutting its workers’ real pay 
by 15 per cent, gave its CEO a compensation package equal to the pay of over 
9,000 Disneyland workers.34  So, here we have the seventh distributional failure 
(and the last in this list) as this increasingly hierarchical pay structure is unlikely 
to be an appropriate reflection of the value of marginal productivities.  The large 
bonuses paid to CEOs of banks as they led their firms to ruin and economies to 
                                   
34  For other examples, see Ahmed (2018); Del Valle (2018); Neale (2018); Pearlstein 
(2019).  
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the brink of collapse, for example, are hard to reconcile with the belief that pay 
has much to do with marginal social contributions these days (Stiglitz, 2016). 
This growing distributional failure is intrinsically related to the OECD’s 
‘reverse catching up with high inequality Latin American countries’ phenomenon, 
as the inability of labour to get the value of its marginal productivity has always 
been one of the key characteristics of countries in which the top 10 per cent gets 
the lions’ share of the half of national income shared by D10 and D1–D4. 
 
Market Inequality vs. Market Efficiency and Productivity 
Growth: How Paradise for the Former Became a Purgatory 
for the Latter.  On ‘Inequality Waves’, and Some Issues for 
Future Research 
 
Does an increase in market inequality help enable or disable growth enhancing 
dynamics?  Figure 8 summarises in a very simple manner some of the main 
points made so far regarding the contrasting impacts that different levels of 
return on capital and market inequality in general can have on efficiency and 
growth. 
FIGURE 8 
Market efficiency and productivity growth vs the rate of return on 
capital and market inequality 
 
● eij*=point at which higher returns on capital and increased market inequality can only 
come, as a norm, at the cost of market efficiency; The subscript ‘i’ indicates that the level 
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of ‘e*’ may vary across sectors.  In turn, the subscript ‘j’ indicates that the level of ‘ei*’ 
can also vary along the technological cycle (Pérez, 2002, 2016).  g* and r* = levels of 
market inequality and return on capital associated with e*.  Also, esp. = especially; bt = 
between; inc. = including; IPRs = intellectual property rights (see footnote 58; N = 
national; on bubbles, see also footnote 58; and pr. = problems. 
 
The basic hypothesis portrayed in Figure 8 is that after ‘e*’ (given ‘i’ and ‘j’), the 
relationship between market efficiency and the return on capital — and market 
inequality in general — resembles the second half of an inverted-U.  That is, 
inevitably, there comes a point at which further increases in the return on capital 
and in market inequality can only come (as a norm) at the expense of a rapidly 
declining market efficiency and growth.35   
Within this general hypothesis, the specific point I want to put forward is 
that what most clearly characterises the current twin scenarios in the non- 
Asian emerging world — high corporate profits and market inequality, with 
sluggish growth — is that most non-emerging-Asia economies (and certainly 
those in the OECD) are already well into a generalised ‘post-e*’ state of affairs, 
one that is very familiar to Latin Americans.  As we know so well by now, if 
capitalism is just ‘unleashed’, markets can easily be manipulated by those at the 
top, becoming not just inefficient but self-destructive (as in the ‘cannibalised-
company business model’ discussed above).  That is, the current institutional 
scenario has allowed capital to achieve levels of profits which are only possible 
when some (if not all) of the factors mentioned on the right-hand side of Figure 8 
come into play — at the cost of low levels of investment and productivity 
growth.36  
Although this scenario may well be capable of generating an excess supply 
of ‘silly-billys’, it can only do so at an increasing cost in terms of sluggish growth 
                                   
35  The nature of several factors on both sides of Figure 8 is far more complex than that of 
those typical of the standard paradigm of well-functioning markets solving Adam Smith-
type problems via the invisible hand.  For example, IPRs (despite the likely protestation of 
lobbyists of industries such as pharmaceuticals) are located at the right-hand side of the 
Figure because they may actually slow down (rather than speed up) the pace of innovation.  
As these rights relate to knowledge (and information), they may well be counterproductive, 
as knowledge is a (global) public good (that is, there are no marginal costs associated with 
its use).  Therefore, restricting its use via the enforcement of traditional property rights 
(e.g., TRIPS) would necessarily cause market inefficiency, especially because knowledge is 
the main input for the creation of further knowledge.  The need to provide incentives to 
innovate is one thing; artificially restricting access to knowledge is quite another (Stiglitz, 
2007).  In turn, although bubbles surely belong to the right-hand side of the Figure, those 
that help the build-up of the necessary infrastructure for new technological paradigms 
(e.g., the dotcom one) could, at least in part, qualify for the other side of the Figure (Pérez, 
2002). 
36  Some aspects of this phenomenon have been well researched; among the growing 
literature, see Ostry et al. (2014), and Card and Krueger (1995).  The 2018 IMF report on 
the US economy also expresses serious concerns about the current negative interactions 
between higher market concentration and lower levels of investment (IMF, 2018c). 
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and market inefficiency in general.  It is not by chance that the number of 
billionaires has more than doubled since the 2008 financial crisis, and is set to 
double again in a much shorter period of time; and last year their wealth 
increased by record amounts (PwC and UBS, 2018).  But this paradise for ‘silly-
billys’ becomes a purgatory for the real economy—and for the rest of us.  Indeed, 
in 2017 the US economy managed the greatest gap ever recorded between 
‘efforts and accomplishments’: while corporate profits reached an all-time high, 
investment (relative to GDP, or the income share of the top 10 per cent) came 
close to an all-time low.  It is as if in economics the law of gravity has taken a 
sabbatical; but when it returns — as it inevitably will — it may come back with a 
vengeance (Palma, 2009). 
Moreover, these ‘silly-billys’ — by succeeding in constructing a ‘post-e*’ 
paradise on earth — have also constructed economies that can only go forward if 
pulled by ever more ‘extraordinary’ fiscal and monetary policies.  As Summers 
explains, ‘If budget deficits had… not [grown] relative to the economy… [and if] 
an extra $10tn in wealth had not been created by abnormal stock market returns, 
it is hard to believe that the US economy would be growing much at all’ 
(Summers, 2018).  The problem now is what to do next, and secular 
stagnationists can only think of more of the same.  For Krugman (2013) the core 
problem is clear: ‘If the market wants a strongly negative real interest rate, we’ll 
have persistent problems until we find a way to deliver such a rate’.  So, let’s 
keep refilling the punch bowl for the few, let’s keep making transfers to those 
that are (unnecessarily) left behind, and let’s keep over-borrowing and over-
taxing the new ‘silent majority’ to finance both — and let’s keep hoping that they 
continue to be silent.37  For Keynesians, the bottom line is very different: how to 
reconstruct a type of scenario characterised by the left-hand side of Figure 8.  
Basically, it is about time that governments start exercising different forms of 
state agency aiming at ‘disciplining’ the capitalist élite into spending productively 
(that is, aimed at creating ‘compulsions’ for increased productive spending by 
corporations and those at the top).  And it is about time that governments start 
‘disciplining’ themselves into doing the same via increased public investment 
financed by progressive taxation.  Current proposals for a ‘Green New Deal’, for 
example — one that would transform green issues from problems into solutions 
— are not just essential for environmental protection, but they are desperately 
needed for all of the above.  The same is true about recreating the growth-
enhancing link between wages and productivity.  It is not often that reason, 
                                   
37  As Einstein emphasised, insanity is doing the same thing over and over again and 
expecting different results. 
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ethics and economic logic coincide in such a remarkable way! I can’t remember 
the last time that mind, soul and smart pockets were being pulled in the same 
direction—the only missing ingredient now is the muscle, including the ideological 
one (as discussed above, and as Gramsci rightly said, battles of this kind are 
usually won or lost on the field of ideology). 
In sum, the left-hand side of Figure 8 illustrates the ‘enabling’ scenario for 
sustainable growth-enhancing dynamics.  Rational and intelligent agents 
interacting in competitive and properly regulated markets, with all the required 
conditions, government agencies and policies indicated in the Figure (and more), 
may well be able to set in motion processes of cumulative causation, 
characterised by their positive feedback loops into the system, and capable of 
generating a momentum of change which may become self-perpetuating (e.g., in 
the Veblen/Myrdal or the Smith/Young/Kaldor manner).  It will still be capitalism, 
warts and all, but at least it will be a capitalism capable of developing the 
productive forces of society in a sustainable way.  However, as the post-war 
scenario illustrates, even the best policies can become inflexible and get outdated 
if they are unresponsive to change.  But as Hirschman (1982) argued, people 
often stick with policies after they have become counterproductive.  This leads to 
such frustration and disappointment with existing policies and institutions that it 
is not uncommon to experience a ‘rebound effect’ — as the one that started at 
the end of the 1970s.  This also helps to explain the messianic attitude of the 
neoliberal tsunami, as well as its poor outcome.  And as now neo-liberalism has 
long passed its sell-by date, a new ‘rebound effect’ is long overdue — and the 
longer it is delayed, the stronger (and perhaps also the more mechanistic) it may 
become. 
Recent events, however, have shown that one of the peculiarities of the 
scenario built since the 1980s (on the right-hand side of the Figure) is that, once 
established, it seems to have very few, if any, endogenous pressures for an 
‘upgrade’.  Once achieved, it takes on the characteristics of a Hotel California: 
‘We are [only] programmed to receive.  You can check out any time you like, but 
you can never leave’.38  And the (not so) invisible hand of the (not so) unfettered 
market forces is unlikely to come to the rescue.  In other words, neo-liberalism, 
as an ideology, has proved to be such an effective technology of power that it has 
so far paralysed most of its opposition.  That is, borrowing from Kafka’s ‘The 
Silence of the Sirens’ (1917/1995), the (unequalising) sirens have, up to now, 
                                   
38  That is the main aim, for example, of the new (so-called) ‘trade’ agreements, such as 
the TTP-11, which are basically intended to be policy straightjackets to prevent emerging 
markets from rethinking their development strategies (Palma, 2018a). 
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had a still more fatal weapon than their song, namely the ideological silence of 
their ‘progressive’ opposition. 
It is this cyclical switching between the two sides of Figure 8 which has 
generated, at least in part, the ‘distributional waves’ of the last century.  And 
when on the right-hand side of Figure 8 (where we currently are — let’s call it 
‘scenario 2’) Piketty’s (2014) ‘r>g’ becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy, because a 
self-constructed increase in ‘r’ is what this scenario is all about — and a 
struggling ‘g’ is the inevitable collateral damage (in this scenario, increased 
market inequality is as much a twin of inefficiency as the apple is of the law of 
gravity).  At the same time, the waves I have in mind differ from Milanovic’s 
(2016) ‘Kuznets waves’ as mine are more about Gramsci than Kuznets, 
Hirschman than Solow, Mazzucato, Amsden or Pérez than his understanding of 
the relationship between technology and inequality.  My waves are about self-
construction rather than fundamental forces of the universe.  What matters most 
in them are issues such as what it is that helps in the formation of collective 
beliefs.  How do spontaneous consensus types of hegemony emerge? How can 
they be changed? That is, they are more about ideology than technology, agency 
than structure, choice than historical ‘accidents’, discursive articulation than 
economic determinism, fighting distributional failures in a Keynesian sense rather 
than surrendering to them (`a la ‘new left’).  Another perspective from which to 
look at my type of waves is that of Foucault’s relationship between power and 
knowledge, in particular the role of the economic ‘discipline’ in democracy (as a 
form of ‘disciplinary power’ via the production of particular kinds of knowledge).  
From this standpoint, what we really need to fight inequality — i.e., to help set in 
motion the next ‘wave’ — is to have a more critical perspective within economics 
of the range of our options for participation. 
In the type of distributional waves I have in mind — and to differentiate 
them from ‘Milanovic’s waves’, let’s call them ‘Palma waves’ (in which 
Hirschman’s ‘rebound effect’ can play an important role) — what matters most is 
to take responsibility for our distributional choices (e.g., aiming at ‘scenario 1’ or 
‘2’ in Figure 8, remembering that these are policy ‘package’, and you mostly can’t 
pick and choose).  Above all, there is no room for claims that we are just 
somehow innocent bystanders of irrepressible distributional forces.  No-one has 
forced the OECD to ‘bananise’ their market inequality by moving ever further into 
‘scenario 2’.  This choice is as much a self-defining act as any can be.   
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CONCLUSIONS 
As this essay has already emphasised, in order to understand current distributive 
dynamics one needs to study the share of the rich — and, in terms of growth, 
what leads them to choose what to do with their income and wealth, and in which 
of the two scenarios of Figure 8 they have to perform.  Schumpeter (1918: 7) 
stated that ‘The fiscal history of a people is above all an essential part of its 
general history’.  I would add that its (closely related) distributional history is just 
as essential.    
However, given the many limitations of all types of distributional data, one 
should try to look at the distribution of income from all possible angles, including 
surveys, tax returns and payrolls.39  This article (in both Part 1 and 2) has mainly 
offered an analysis from the point of view of surveys — a perspective in which 
inequality, with all its veils and market failures, becomes a subject so complex 
that I have tried to discuss in as much detail as necessary.   
Although the 2018 World Economic Forum identified the ever-growing gap 
between rich and poor as ‘the problem’, it seems that anxieties about inequality 
per se have somehow evaporated with the realisation that a new layer of 
distorting mirrors — such as those provided by Trump, Brexit and the re-
emergence of the extreme right — can help project resentment away from 
inequality and onto bad economics, xenophobia, homophobia and other forms of 
hatred and intolerance.40  And while many in the global élite feel very 
uncomfortable with these events, due to their lack of ideological sophistication 
and the fact that they are nourished by a cruder cult of violence, they have 
nonetheless adapted to these changes rather well — like an aristocratic family in 
a Jane Austen novel forced to welcome some newly discovered lower-class 
relatives (Byatt and Sodré, 
1995; Sodré, 2015).    
In this two-part article, I have identified nine stylised facts concerning the 
diversity of inequality and seven distributional failures, with few countries able to 
escape them altogether.  The first five stylised facts refer to the distribution of 
disposable income, and are identified in Part 1.41  In turn, the next four stylised 
                                   
39  On survey data, see Appendix 1; on tax returns, see WID (2019) and Alvaredo et al. 
(2018); and on payroll data, see UTIP (2019).  Regarding WID (2019), it would be more 
useful if its compilers would not mix in their database the bottom 40 per cent with some of 
the middle.  It would be great if they could provide separate information for D1–D4, and 
D5–D9.   Solt (2018), too, could help a great deal by providing information on market 
inequality by deciles.  
40  All of which reminds us of Chekhov’s statement: ‘There is nothing more awful, insulting, 
and depressing than banality’ (Chekhov, 2006: 238). 
41  See Palma (2019c).  
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facts refer to market inequality, and they have been discussed in this second part 
of the paper; and they are: i) significant deteriorations since the 1980s have been 
confined to the OECD, Eastern Europe and Russia, and China and India; ii) most 
OECD countries attain a low level of disposable income inequality via a tortuous 
and highly inefficient route; iii) emerging markets with extreme inequality in both 
areas are normally those whose higher tolerance for inequality leads them to let 
market inequality get out of control, and to make little fiscal effort to correct this; 
and iv) increased market inequality in the OECD has really been about extracting 
value created by others, or of cashing-in on assets already in existence. 
Regarding distributional failures, this essay has identified seven, with 
three of them relating to disposable income (Part 1).  In turn, those relating to 
market inequality are: i) the OECD’s ever less sustainable disparity between 
market and social distributional outcomes; ii) unequal middle-income countries 
letting oligarchies run amok, while doing more talking than acting in terms of 
social protection; iii) the very small proportion of the deluge of extra income 
appropriated by those at the top in the OECD — and of soaring corporate profits 
— that has been diverted to productive uses, such as investment; and iv) 
increasingly hierarchical pay structures that are unlikely to be an appropriate 
reflection of the value of marginal social contributions. 
As to market inequality, it is remarkable how the election of Reagan and 
Thatcher, and the fall of that infamous wall, triggered among the OECD some 
reverse catching up, including the ‘bananisation’ of their market inequality.  As 
Warren Buffet suggests, ‘When you combine leverage with ignorance, you get 
some pretty interesting results’.42 
We are all indeed converging in this neoliberal era, but the route map 
points towards features characteristic of some highly unequal middle-income 
countries: huge inequalities due to mobile élites claiming property rights over the 
rewards of economic growth in a winner-takes-all scenario.  Last year they nearly 
got there: 82 per cent of the new wealth created was appropriated by the richest 
1 per cent, while the poorest half of humanity got nothing (Oxfam, 2018; see also 
Hope, 2018) — and the surreal politics underpinning this.  It is even tempting to 
say, ‘Welcome to the Third World’.43  
                                   
42  Quoted on the home page of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.’s website: http://berkshirehath 
away340.weebly.com/about-us.html 
43   Trump is like a composite of Latin America’s ‘Magnificent Seven’, those visionary 
leaders who selflessly introduced neoliberal reforms to the region: his business practices 
resemble those of Salinas; his aesthetic sense, Menem; his attachment to democracy, 
Fujimori; his human rights, Pinochet; his ideological sophistication, Collor; his fiscal 
earnestness, Pérez; and his mental health, Bucaram. 
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This has also happened with regard to the economic role of the state, 
which has switched from being the heart of innovation and change, to being the 
epitome of inaction — reminding us of those Conrad novels where, as in so many 
sea stories, the main enemy of creativity is stasis.  It is, in fact, the deadliest 
thing of all (Segal, 1997).44 It seems that these states also misunderstood what it 
means to have a new ‘subsidiary’ role, and took it to mean that they should keep 
subsidising the rent-seeking practices of free-riding capital. 
If Smith’s ‘invisible hand’ existed, and were what guides behaviour, this 
relentless increase in market inequality could not have taken place, as market 
‘compulsions’ would have easily put a stop to it — and to its artificially ‘tailor-
made’ foundations.  In fact, it now feels almost ridiculous even having to say this 
— like the person at a circus pointing out that when the magician saws a woman 
in half, it’s only a trick!  
In the words of Krugman (2009), the last financial crisis exposed it all: 
‘America is looking like the Bernie Madoff of economies: for many years it was 
held in respect, even awe, but it turns out to have been a fraud all along’. 
For Stiglitz (2012), as far as financial markets are concerned, globalisation 
‘opened up opportunities to find new people to exploit their ignorance.  And we 
found them’.  And at home (Stiglitz, 2018): ‘The American economy is rigged’; 
‘The rules of the economic game have been rewritten, both globally and 
nationally, in ways that advantage the rich and disadvantage the rest’. 
Moreover, as Tony Atkinson reminds us, increased market inequality leads 
to more of the same due to its cumulative causation, because, ‘inequality of 
outcome… directly affects equality of opportunity for the next generation’ 
(Atkinson, 2015: 11).  In fact, an average wealthy family in the US now spends 
US$ 1.7 million per child from nursery to high school to help them get into the 
Ivy League (Jackson, 2017) — moving the US even higher in the ‘Great Gatsby 
curve’, and ever closer to Latin American countries.45 
Even some of the founding fathers of neo-liberalism might have been 
shocked, as it turned into an artificial environment (of the type of ‘scenario 2’ in 
Figure 8) in which (paraphrasing Oscar Wilde) anyone trying to make money by 
doing something socially useful simply lacked imagination.46 
                                   
44  On the state’s role in innovation, see Freeman (2008); Mazzucato (2013, 2018).  
45  According to this relationship, the more unequal the country, the more likely it is that 
those who are born affluent will keep their status. And if those amazing sums spent per 
child are not enough, fraud becomes a convenient ‘Plan B’ for getting them into the Ivy 
League (The FT View, 2019; Vandevelde and Chaffin, 2019).  
46  For an analysis of the original ideas of neo-liberalism, see Foucault (2004); see also 
Frangie (2008); Palma (2009).  
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I wonder if Karl Popper, for example, would have now added the new 
breed of all-powerful rentiers to his list of enemies of his ‘open society’.47 
Or (using his own concepts), if he would have called current economic 
structures a new form of ‘totalitarianism’ (with their questionable means and 
arbitrary power).  Surely he would also have declared that hegemonic neoliberal 
ideas (especially economic ones) have become immune from being ‘falsified’ by 
criticism; and that neoliberal idealisation of unregulated markets has become a 
new form of ‘primitive myth’.   
A century ago, the Spanish philosopher José Ortega y Gasset (1918) 
stated that ‘many [in Latin America] have a narcissistic tendency to use reality as 
a mirror for self-contemplation’.  He found the existence of so many ‘self-satisfied 
individuals’ striking — a phenomenon that for him was a major obstacle for 
progress.  Perhaps there is no better way of summarising what is wrong with so 
many current political settlements and distributive outcomes than Ortega’s 
observations, as these Latin American features have been globalised with a 
vengeance.  As a wealth manager has summarised it, plainly and concisely, ‘In 
the wealth management industry, now you have to kiss a lot of frogs’ (quoted in 
Ross, 2019).   
Current wishful thinking regarding the long-term sustainability of such a 
(‘post-e*’) environment — including the sustainability of the growing asymmetry 
between market and social distributive outcomes in the OECD — has truly 
become delusional.  As argued above, the only low-inequality that is sustainable 
is the one that is anchored in the production structure, so, unless we re-engineer 
our development strategy and get a grip on market inequality, we will not only 
have to keep paying a high price for its inefficiency, but will even be putting our 
democracy (and our collective sanity) at risk. 
The fundamental problem with the current neoliberal development 
strategy is that there are not many ways to reshape the structure of a ‘system’ 
with so little entropy (as it were): there are few ways in which one can redesign 
its fundamental structure (so that it can move ‘forward’ in time), if one can’t 
change the fundamentals of its status quo — that those at the top continue to 
appropriate such an absurd share of national income, and for doing the (low 
hanging fruit) type of activities they do now.  The main problem with such a 
‘system’ is that so much energy is wasted in trying to ‘stop time’, that there is 
little energy left to move the system forward.  And if anything has to be sacrificed, 
                                   
47  For Popper’s ‘Open Society and its Enemies’, see: 
https://archive.org/stream/TheOpenSocietyAndItsEnemiesPopperKarlSir/The+Open+Socie
ty+and+Its+Enemies+-+Popper%2C+Karl+Sir_djvu.txt 
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recent events indicate that it is likely to be democracy.48  Indeed, it is quite 
remarkable how this neoliberal model has proved so effective thus far at 
reproducing and maintaining itself, as if a sort of autopoiesian system when 
considered as a whole.  So far attempts to change it structurally have failed as its 
networks have tended to remain unchanged, maintaining their identity and 
proving surprisingly effective at regulating its composition and conserving its 
boundaries. 
This has become evident in the current re-emergence of neo-fascism, as 
one of its common characteristics is the tendency to mix extreme-right politics 
and ‘dark ages’ morality, with exactly the same primordial neoliberal economics 
and acute inequality (despite some populist discursive indulgences à la Trump).49  
Since extreme inequality has been shown to be intrinsically corrosive on so 
many fronts, I see no valid positive or normative reasons to justify why we 
cannot live in a world with a much narrower spectrum of inequality — all the way 
up to a Palma ratio of around 1 in terms of disposable income, with the middle 
and upper-middle getting at least their half.  In terms of market inequality, I also 
see no objective reason for such uncreative destruction of all of those remarkable 
post-war achievements.  My main unease is that the mounting challenges that we 
face are happening at the worst possible time, as our social imagination has 
seldom been so barren.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                   
48  As President Bolsonaro proudly boosts, ‘Democracy and liberty only exist when your 
armed forces want them to’ (Viga Gaier, 2019).  Perhaps a less crude way to express this 
worldview would be ‘democracy and liberty only exist if “markets” can afford them’. 
49  Bolsonaro, for example, can say in the same sentence that Brazil’s military regime 
should have killed people rather than just tortured them, and that he would prefer his son 
to be dead rather than gay; but when it comes to economics, he then becomes ‘modern’ 
and wants to privatise pensions and anything that moves in the public sector (including the 
strategic sector that the military used to be concerned with, and what would be left of 
social protection); he is also happy to let manufacturing become an optional extra, cut 
even further the meagre taxes paid by the rich and big corporations, stop safeguards 
protecting the Amazon and other aspects of the environment, and eradicate all vestiges of 
redistributive ‘socialism’ (Palma, 2018b). 
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APPENDIX: FIVE PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH THE OECD’S 
GROWING DISPARITY BETWEEN MARKET AND SOCIAL 
DISTRIBUTIVE OUTCOMES  
 
As mentioned in stylised fact 2.2 above, what we are witnessing in the OECD is 
another type of distributional failure (number 4 on my list), which is about the 
ever less sustainable disparity between market and social distributional outcomes, 
and its inevitable plethora of distortions, transaction costs and public debts.  Here 
I want to expand on five of them.  
First, the OECD’s relentless increase in market inequality has obviously not 
been ‘Pareto-improving’, as there have been so many losers.  However, a Pareto-
efficiency type scrutiny is too weak a criterion for normative analysis; making it 
more operational requires a distributional metric, such as something resembling a 
social welfare function.  And as the steady trajectory of Germany’s disposable 
income Gini indicates (Figure 2, above), it seems patently clear that this was the 
non-negotiable anchor.  That is, no matter what happened in the market (or why, 
or how), this was unalterable.  More specifically, the absolute anchor was a totally 
stable share for D5–D9 (see Appendix 4, above).  So, given this constraint, surely 
it would have made more sense (and been far more efficient) for Germany to 
have taken stock of this — as Korea did — and to limit how much the capitalist 
élite was allowed to change resource allocation for the purposes of self-
enrichment, even in the unlikely scenario that they might have chosen to do it 
efficiently.  
Second, inevitably, there are significant transaction costs: what would be 
the point of such market distributional deterioration just for the winners 
to compensate those left behind (via taxes and transferences)? It is surely a 
government failure not to minimise the inevitable waste of resources inherent in 
first letting things go one way, only to reverse them later — as in the already 
mentioned nursery rhyme, in which the Grand Old Duke of York marched his ten 
thousand men to the top of the hill, only to march them down again. 
However, third — and crucially — this distributional failure is even more 
problematic: while the winners got away scot-free, those with less political and 
economic clout had to finance compensations.  That is, instead of making the real 
winners compensate the losers, in our new modernity it is ‘not-the real-winners’ 
who have been forced by the governments to do this.  In the US, for example, 
not only does Warren Buffett’s secretary pay more taxes than he does, but also 
billionaire residents in Manhattan’s finest luxury towers only pay about half the 
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federal income tax paid by their concierges, security guards and cleaners.50  And 
the poorest 20 per cent pay an effective state and local tax rate that is half as 
much again as the top 1 per cent (ITEP, 2018).  Basically, as that infamous New 
York socialite and billionaire boasted, ‘we don’t pay taxes; little people do’ 
(Rampell, 2009).  On top of that, tax cuts under Trump have reduced Federal tax 
receipts from corporate income by half.51   
Europe’s ‘reverse catching up’ with this Latin-style regressive taxation 
became almost as thorough.52  As late as the early 1990s, 12 OECD countries still 
had taxes on net wealth (Sandbu, 2019a).  Things are very different now — even 
though, if just one-third of net wealth (e.g., the least productive) was taxed at 2 
per cent, that would generate about 5 per cent of GDP of extra fiscal resources 
(Sandbu, 2019b).53  
The Danske Bank’s € 200 billion money-laundering scandal, the world’s 
biggest, also exposed the extent of Europe’s tax evasion and avoidance.54  As a 
law professor states, ‘There’s no reason anymore to fear prosecution for 
committing serious corporate crimes’ (quoted in Protess et al., 2018).55  
Why fear prosecution indeed, when — if convicted for tax fraud — instead of 
prison one may be just sent back to university! In Chile, a judge recently sent 
corporate executives convicted of a major tax fraud on a course in corporate 
ethics (with the condition that they had to get a passing grade!), and two 
prosecutors lost their jobs for investigating corrupt corporate money in politics.  
At the same time, large corporations such as the FAANGs hardly pay any taxes on 
                                   
50  See Gilson (2011).  The IRS tabulates tax returns by ZIP codes, but some buildings in 
New York are so large that they have their own ZIP. 
51  For Federal Reserve economic data, see: https://fred.stlouisfed.org/.  And all this in a 
country in which the combined rate of tax on the income of high earners could rise to 73 
per cent without proving counter-productive (Diamond and Saez, 2011).  As Summers 
(2017) argues, in Trump’s tax cuts the sums do not add up.  And Krugman (2017) rightly 
asks, where are those prominent ‘deficit-hawk’ Republican economists hiding?  
52  In the UK, ‘New Labour’ Chancellor of the Exchequer Gordon Brown created a tax break 
for partners of private equity firms, by which they only had to pay a 10 per cent capital 
gains tax on the sales of shares, instead of the usual 40 per cent.  He did this while 
abolishing the 10 per cent tax band for low incomes, making all earnings above the 
personal allowance taxable at 20 per cent.  As one private equity partner admitted, thanks 
to ‘socialist’ New Labour he now pays a lower rate than his cleaner (Prynn, 2007).  
53  For Sandbu (2019b), a columnist in the Financial Times, ‘[a] net wealth tax… may be 
the least harmful way to tax capital, even to the point of boosting productivity growth… . 
[It could] penalise low-return investments and reward high-return ones’.  
54  UK partnerships (largely limited-liability partnerships) comprised the second largest 
non-resident client group at the offending branch of Danske Estonian (Binham and Parker, 
2018).  In fact, Danske’s board gave its CEO a full year’s salary as severance payment 
(US$ 1.8 m), and then closed down the branch to cover up.  And an executive declared 
‘[Danske Bank] has no obligation to report false client accounts to the authorities’ (quoted 
in Milne and Binham, 2018).  Even García Márquez would have smiled.  
55  In this ‘too-big-to-jail’ world, when HSBC became the bank of choice of Mexican drug 
cartels, or Standard Chartered of those on the official terrorist list, they just got a fine and 
no one went to prison. 
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profits due to imaginative tax schemes.56  The Tax Justice Network estimates tax 
losses of half a trillion dollars due to global shifting of profits (Cobham and Janský, 
2017).57  In fact, the Financial Times now asks if money laundering has become 
the favourite crime of the élite (Dizard, 2018a).58 Who said that crime doesn’t 
pay? 
All of this means that in this third aspect of this distributional failure 
others must be ‘over-taxed’ to keep the disposable income Gini somehow under 
control.  In the UK, for example, Thatcher, while dropping the top rate of income 
tax from over 80 per cent to 40 per cent (Reagan did so from 70 per cent to 28 
per cent), increased the regressive VAT from 8 per cent to 20 per cent as 
transfers rocketed — largely due to the transformation of the proletariat into the 
poor-letariat.59  In fact, Thatcher’s government never fulfilled its repeated 
promises to reduce the GDP share of the public finances: it simply shifted taxes 
around.  These increased transfers surely fail ‘the compensation test’ — of the 
Kaldor–Hicks variety — as the real winners got away with their gains, and those 
not invited to the party were left with the bill.  Incidentally, but relatedly, the 
winners would have had plenty with which to compensate others, to make 
increased inequality into a ‘Kaldor–Hicks improvement’ process—but we would 
need another FDR to sort this out.60  
This misguided targeting to finance social protection is what traditional 
critics of the welfare state get so wrong.  When a German philosopher called it 
‘fiscal kleptocracy’ (Sloterdijk, 2010), he ignored the fact that the ‘new’ welfare 
state is as much a subsidy to the rich as a help to the poor, since one way to 
                                   
56  Such as the ‘double Irish with a Dutch sandwich’; the ‘Irish inversion’; exemption of 
foreign affiliate income from additional home country tax; transfer pricing; inter-firm 
royalty payments; intra-corporate loans; the geographical allocation of parent overheads 
and costs; tax havens; and ‘round-tripping’ (Contractor, 2016; Houlder, 2014; Houlder et 
al., 2014). 
57  It is amazing how some corporations manage to get huge market capitalisation despite 
consistently reporting losses.  For a proposal for a new corporate taxation system, see 
Wolf (2019).  On the relationship between international tax competition and inequality, see 
FitzGerald and Dayle Siu (2019). 
58  And the FED seems happy to oblige; while the EU took out of circulation its largest 
denomination bill to combat money laundering, the FED, instead, has doubled the number 
of hundred-dollar bills in circulation (to US$ 1.3 trillion) since 2008, making it the most 
widely used dollar-note; in a supposed ‘digital era’, now there are 13 billion hundred-dollar 
bills stuffed into wallets, safes and suitcases globally helping hide transactions (Tett, 2019).   
59  Unemployment immediately jumped by 2 million (1 million in manufacturing) (Marcel 
and Palma, 1988; Palma, 2005, 2008). 
60  For example, in 1982 a person needed only US$ 75 million to qualify for the Forbes 400 
(at today’s prices it would be about double that); today it is not far off US$ 3 billion 
(Thomhave, 2018).  And in the US, the top three billionaires now have as much wealth as 
the bottom half of the population combined.  In turn, the retirement assets of just 100 
CEOs are now equivalent to the entire retirement savings of 116 million fellow citizens 
(Collins, 2018; Collins and Hoxie, 2018; see also Anderson and Klinger, 2015; Palma, 
2016b).  
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solve the ‘Hobbesian Dilemma’ of how to keep the peace in societies with such 
contradictory distributional aims is for governments to ‘rob’ someone other than 
the real winners to compensate those who have become redundant in the new 
forms of capitalist accumulation.  The generous trillion-dollar bank rescue 
packages of 2008–09, and the over US$ 15 trillion QE-liquidity-pumping machine 
(which exchanged old bad financial assets for good new money, and drove asset 
prices skywards on the way) have made the very rich the biggest welfare 
recipients of all time.  So, as mentioned above, our German philosopher should 
know better: today’s post-modern Robin Hood welfare state robs the rich to give 
to the very rich! 
The urgent need to avoid a total financial collapse after 2008 was one 
thing, but it was quite another to rescue financial institutions without demanding 
in return a proportional ownership of them — one that could then be sold when 
markets picked up again to recover those subsidies.  This was the Swedish route 
to dealing with its 1990s financial crisis: to extract a pound of flesh from bank 
shareholders before writing cheques.61  As the Financial Times reports, ‘All told, 
the primary effect of monetary policy since 2008 has been to transfer wealth to 
those who already hold long-term assets — both real and financial — from those 
who never will’ (Kay, 2016).  Basically, higher wealth inequality and shifting taxes 
down the income scale were not the unintended consequences of this policy, but 
its very objective — and it did so by driving a growing wedge between those who 
depend on wages for their (over-taxed and fairly stagnant) income, and those 
who depend on (under-taxed and rocketing) rents of all kinds, dividends and 
capital gains.  Even Paul Volker now calls the US a ‘plutocracy’62 — one in which 
the share of labour in national income fell by 8 percentage points. 
Meanwhile, in China it has grown by more than 14 percentage points since 
2007 (to over 60 per cent), with the minimum wage growing up to 20 per cent 
p.a.  in parts of China.  A similar pattern has unfolded elsewhere in Asia since the 
global financial crisis, with the labour share of income jumping by about 10 
percentage points in Vietnam, the Philippines and Indonesia, and by more modest 
amounts in India, Malaysia and Pakistan (Johnson, 2019). 
In the UK, instead, real wages since the 2008 crisis have had their worst 
performance since the Napoleonic Wars.  In Cambridge, for example, average 
                                   
61  Sweden did not just bail out its financial institutions by having the government take 
over the bad debts.  ‘It… held banks responsible and turned the government into an owner.  
When distressed assets were sold, the profits flowed to taxpayers, and the government 
was able to recoup more money later by selling its shares in the companies as well’ 
(Dougherty, 2008; see also Palma, 2009). 
62  ‘[One with] people that have convinced themselves that they are rich because they are 
smart… and they don’t like to pay taxes’ (quoted in Collins and Hoxie, 2018).  
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real academic salaries have declined; yet with the deluge of QE liquidity distorting 
asset prices, my house — instead of falling in price proportionally to the scale of 
such a crisis — has actually doubled in price from the already bizarre level it had 
reached before 2008.63  And those capital gains are nicely tax free.  As a Financial 
Times columnist about to retire rightly laments, ‘But who cares if pension savers… 
may find to our horror that we are the (QE) schmucks?’ — as QE has passed the 
buck to pension funds long on zero real-yields bonds (Authers, 2018).  But those 
short on ideas but long on cash have done rather well, as the FTSE 100 has shot 
to an all-time record.  Austerity, what austerity? 
When words are detached from their meanings (e.g., austerity, welfare 
state, quantitative easing), we lose our ideological moorings.  How else can one 
understand that, parallel to the asset-price hype and the tsunami of subsidies to 
the very rich, social protection took the entire ‘austerity’ hit, and now 3.5 million 
children live in poverty in Britain — more than half in some areas (End Child 
Poverty, 2018) — while deaths of homeless people in 2018 were up 24 per cent in 
one year (Strauss, 2018).64  Accounts of poverty and destitution in the US make 
similarly harrowing reading: for example, within a 3-mile radius in Massachusetts 
(from Cambridge to Roxbury), life expectancy drops by 30 years.65  Perhaps the 
only thing I agree with that German philosopher about is that, despite progress, 
‘civilisation’s potential for barbarism has also been growing’ (Sloterdijk, 1999). 
The fourth distortion created by the disparity between market and social 
distributional outcomes that I want to highlight is that public debts are soaring.  
As the European Union’s transfers have ballooned, the share of ‘social protection’ 
now stands at 40 per cent of public expenditure.  If we add in public health and 
education, this share jumps to two-thirds (Eurostat, 2019; Lindert, 2010; OECD, 
2019).  However, since there are limits to taxing those ‘not-the-real-winners’, 
governments’ debts are skyrocketing.  In the EU they averaged two-thirds of GDP 
before the 2008 crisis; now they are close to 90 per cent.  As the International 
                                   
63  Not that long ago, borough council employees where I used to live in London paid eight 
times their average annual salary for a property; now it is more than 20 times (and for a 
smaller house) (ONS, 2017) — in a city that at least for some is beginning to resemble 
Fritz Lang’s Metropolis.  I can’t remember the last time I saw a financial price reflect a 
fundamental.  But do any of the Washington Consensus ‘get-the-prices-right’ zealots care 
anymore? Central bankers certainly don’t.  Something similar happened in parts of the US, 
where in the last decade median real hourly earning has remained stagnant, while house 
prices in cities such as San Francisco have doubled (BLS, 2018).  
64  All this led a British judge to call the current welfare system ‘cumbersome, overrun and 
creaking’ (ITV, 2019). 
65  Statement by Rep.  Ayanna Pressley (D-Mass), quoted in McKiernan (2019).  See also 
Abramsky (2013); Alston (2017). 
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Monetary Fund (IMF) indicates, the OECD’s public sector finances are in a sorry 
state (IMF, 2018a).66  
As discussed above, the new tax status of corporations and top incomes is 
based on the idea that now they have the right to part-pay/part-lend their taxes 
(as well as part-pay/part-lend their wages) (Palma, 2009).  No need any more for 
old-fashioned tax structures where they had to pay for public goods via 
progressive taxation; nor for old-fashioned production structures based on 
positive but challenging wage–productivity dynamics (see Figure 7, above).  
As for governments, while it is so easy and cheap to turn a blind eye to 
the rising costs of all those self-constructed welfare needs — e.g., in real terms, 
the US minimum wage is now more than a quarter below where it was half a 
century ago, so a parent earning the minimum wage today does not even get 
above the federal poverty line — why not just kick the inevitable ever increasing 
debts into the long grass and, for the time being, forget all about the highly 
inefficient nature of all this? Speculators with more liquidity than imagination help 
by actually paying for the privilege of lending money to governments.  But for 
how long? 
It is difficult to imagine how much longer the current delusion of 
sustainability of this growing asymmetry trap between market and social 
outcomes can continue: that one can go on living with some semblance of 
civilisation, while market inequality and debts are being propelled into outer 
space by an all-powerful inertia.  It is as if a ‘compulsive daydreaming’ type 
attitude takes over, with its growing detachment from external reality and 
mounting passivity.  On the one hand it is like the Chilean president quoted above 
(‘in this life there are only two types of problems: those that will get solved by 
themselves, and those that have no solution’); and on the other, there is the 
persistent wishful thinking that this problem will be of the first kind.  In the 
meantime, mobile élites can keep creaming off the rewards of economic growth, 
and enjoying social peace too. 
Fifth and finally: now that OECD markets have finally been unshackled 
from all those Keynesian ‘rigidities’ and ‘distortions’ brought about by well 
intentioned but supposedly economically misguided post-war policies, are Latin 
America’s levels of market inequality the new nirvana? And is the explosion of the 
stock of financial assets the best guide for resource allocation? 
                                   
66  In an otherwise excellent report, the IMF, however, fails to emphasise that the bottom 
line of this is a new combination of growing market inequality with a new tax status for 
those who benefit most from it.  As mentioned above, the former creates new necessities 
for public expenditure, while the latter denies the necessary finance as it lets those at the 
top free-ride on public goods paid for by others—including the social peace facilitated by 
others paying the cost of keeping the disposable income-Gini relatively under control.  
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Have OECD countries really embarked on a ‘creative destruction’ of those 
rigidities? In fact, Moody’s has calculated that, of the resources generated by QE, 
often less than 1 per cent was used to create new productive capacity (BBC, 
2018). 
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